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THE WALL IS DOWN, NOW WE BUILD
MORE: THE EXCLUSIONARY EFFECTS OF
GATED COMMUNITIES DEMAND
STRICTER BURDENS UNDER THE FHA
ANGEL

M. TRAUB*

Effect, and not motivation, is the touchstone, in part because clever
men may easily conceal their motivations, but more importantly,
because . .. it is a testament to our maturingconcept of equality that
...
we now firmly recognize that the arbitrary quality of
thoughtlessnesscan be as disastrousand unfair to private rightsand
the public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme.2

INTRODUCTION

In 1967, these words were part of a federal district court's
attempt to eradicate the discriminatory effects of the separate but
equal doctrine.3 The court's decision expressed the need for
equality in America. One year later, Congress made a step in this
direction by enacting the Federal Fair Housing Act (FHA).4 The
congressional purpose of the FHA is to provide fair housing
. J.D. Candidate, June 2001.
1. United States v. Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974). In
United States v. Black Jack, the court held a governmental agency to the same
standard as any other defendant in a housing discrimination case under the
FHA. The court held that an ordinance that has a racially discriminatory
effect could only be justified by the defendant showing a compelling
governmental interest. Id. at 1185, 1187. The quote "[e]ffect, and not
motivation, is the touchstone, in part because clever men may easily conceal
their motivations but more importantly, because..." argues that the effect of
a defendant's pretextual business justifications for a discriminatory housing
practice is more important than the motivation behind the practice. Id.
2. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967). The court
stated in full:
The complaint that analytically no violation of equal protection vests
unless the inequalities stem from a deliberately discriminatory plan is
simply false. Whatever the law was once, it is a testament to our
maturing concept of equality that, with the help of Supreme Court
decisions in the last decade, we now firmly recognize that the arbitrary
quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private
rights and the public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme.
Id.
3. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1999).
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throughout the United States by prohibiting discrimination in the
sale and rental of housing.'
Through the FHA, Congress has made a permanent effort to
make housing available to all persons regardless of race, color,
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.6 Since
the FHA's enactment and subsequent amendments, landlords and
real estate developers, once free to discriminate, have been limited
in their ability to do so.
However, many individuals still feel the effects of
discrimination due to a swell in new types of housing communities
in America. As America grows, so too do her people's fortunes,
status and fears. With this growth comes a change in ideals and a
change in communities. One change has been the evolution of
common interest developments (CID's)7 over the last two decades.8
This has had the effect of closing off once open neighborhoods and
restricting the property owner's freedom through majority-run
self-governance. 9
Part I of this Comment examines the most controversial type
of CID, gated communities, and the influences and motivations to

5. 42 U.S.C. § 3601.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d).
7. Common interest developments are known by several different and
conceptually interchangeable terms, i.e., common interest communities,
planned unit developments (PUD's), residential community associations,
homeowners' associations and condominium associations.
8. See Evan McKenzie, Reinventing Common Interest Developments:
Reflections on a Policy Role for the Judiciary,31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 397, 399
(1998) (commenting on the rise of interest in CID's and explaining the style of
living as a form of privatization of public responsibilities); EDWARD J.
BLAKELY & MARY GAIL SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA: GATED COMMUNITIES IN
THE UNITED STATES 5-8 (1997) [hereinafter GATED COMMUNITIES] (detailing
an in-depth sociological and psychological study of the development of one
form of CID, the gated community, and its effects on residents and nonresidents of the communities).
Upon publication, GATED COMMUNITIES
estimated as many as 20,000 gated communities that include more than three
million units in the United States. Id. at 7. By spring of 1997, the number
was estimated at 30,000, with four million residents. John B. Owens, Westec
Story: Gated Communities and the Fourth Amendment, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1127, 1128-29 (1997). This estimate is expected to double by the year 2000.
Id. There will be approximately 225,000 common interest communities in the
year 2000. EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND
THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 11 (1994) [hereinafter
PRIVATOPIA] (discussing the rise in community developments and their effects
on privatizing government).
9. See Mary M. Ross, et al., The Zoning Process: Private Land-Use
Controls and Gated Communities, The Impact of Private Property Rights
Legislation, and Other Recent Developments in the Law, 28 URB. LAW. 801,
801-02 (1996) (discussing self-governance as an extreme form of land control
and privatization that gives all authority to a majority community
association). See generally PRIVATOPIA, supra note 8, at 29-55.
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"fort up" behind its walls." Part II discusses laws that foster and
support the expansion of gated community agendum, and the
discriminatory effect such laws have on non-residents.1" Part III
analyzes the constitutional and legislative restraints placed on a
non-resident's cause of action against gated community
restrictions. Taking into account the current lack of judicial
intervention in this matter, Part IV proposes a solution, which
requires a stricter showing of business reasons to overcome
allegations of disparate impact in a FHA cause of action."
I.
A.

THE

CHOICE TO

LIVE BY

RESTRICTION

CID Restrictions: Gated Communities

Several types of CID's" exist with varying degrees of
restrictions on residents and non-residents."' The restrictions on
property use are considered an elemental component of CID's
because of their ability to maintain the commonality of shared
ownership. 5
Ownership of housing in these communities requires
mandatory membership in a housing association, 16 which is

10. See GATED COMMUNITIES, supra note 8, at 30.
11. See David J. Kennedy, Note, Residential Associations as State Actors:
Regulating the Impact of Gated Communities on Nonmembers, 105 YALE L.J.
761, 766-67 (1995) (describing how residential associations can serve as
powerful tools for discrimination and segregation); GATED COMMUNITIES,
supra note 8, at 154-55 (discussing the discriminatory effects gated
communities may cause).
12. Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1999).
13. McKenzie, supra note 8, at 399. Townhome associations are CID's with
limited regulations beyond association dues to pay for common areas, utilities,
upkeep, and recreational space. Condominium associations, on the other
hand, have strict guidelines and regulations that can only be changed by a
majority vote and are generally upheld by the courts as long as they meet the
reasonableness test for rules enacted under the majority.
Nahrstedt v.
Lakeside Village Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 878 P.2d 1275, 1283 (Cal. 1994).
Rules already in place, at the time of planned development and recorded in the
deed, have a strong presumption of validity and do not have to meet the
reasonableness test, as long as they are not arbitrary or in violation of public
policy or a fundamental right. Id.
14. Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 181-82 (Fla.
Ct. App. 1975).
[Ilnherent in the condominium concept is the principle that to promote
the health, happiness, and peace of mind of the majority of the unit
owners since they are living in such close proximity and using facilities
in common, each unit owner must give up a certain degree of freedom of
choice which he might otherwise enjoy in separate, privately owned
property.
Id.
15. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1281.
16. Id.
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responsible for developing and carrying out use restrictions. The
association elects a board of directors that can enforce all use
restrictions that are included in the development's master deed. 8
Additionally, the association, by majority, can establish new rules
that govern the use and occupancy of the property."'
The gated community is the most controversial type of CID.
Gated communities are quickly becoming a prevalent American
residential living system."0
There are several types of gated
communities, from the least restrictive, which permits the most
access to outsiders, to the most restrictive, which allows the least
amount of access.2 ' This Comment focuses on the most restrictive
type of gated community, which is surrounded by a gate or wall
and has security guards monitor egress and regress at property
entrances."
Such communities are expanding to encompass
maintenance of the private roads, parks, schools, and stores within
their walls, which were previously considered public domain."

17. See Hidden Harbour Estates, 309 So. 2d at 181-82 (holding that even a
regulation that is somewhat "arbitrary," such as prohibiting the use of
alcoholic beverages in a clubhouse, will be upheld because it is common that
property owners in association-controlled developments will have some of their
freedom curtailed by the majority decision). Condominium living is more
restrictive than living outside the organization. Id. at 182.
18. Stewart E. Sterk, Minority Protection in Residential Private
Governments, 77 B.U. L. REV. 273, 277-78 (1997).
19. Hidden Harbour Estates, 309 So. 2d at 182.
Common interest
development restrictions on property use limit owners' activities in the
common areas and within the privacy of the home itself. Id.
20. See generally Harvey Rishikof & Alexander Wohl, Private Communities
or Public Governments: "The State Will Make the Call", 30 VAL. U. L. REV.
509, 512-14 (1996) (discussing the rise of gated communities and their
controversial nature because of their private governmental rule-making
bodies). "More recently, particularly in the last thirty years, amidst the fear of
spiraling crime and the dual developments of urban decay and urban
gentrification, Americans have turned increasingly to the security and style of
life offered by private communities, neighborhoods and living associations."
Id. at 512.
21. Rebecca J. Schwartz, Public Gated Residential Communities: The
Rosemont, Illinois, Approach and its ConstitutionalImplications, 29 URB. LAW
123, 123 n.5 (1997).
'Gated community' is used to describe several different scenarios. Some
gated communities are truly access-restricted neighborhoods that
maintain their own roads and can legally restrict access. Other
communities have decorative entry gates that serve primarily as
territorial markers rather than security measures. Still others place
gates across public roads at entry points manned by private security
guards but must allow access to anyone who wants it.
Id.
22. GATED COMMUNITIES, supra note 8, at 30. Gated communities are a
trend toward the exercise of physical and social territory control. "Some walls
are meant to keep people in, some to keep people out. Some are meant to
mark territory and identity, others to exclude." Id.
23. EDWARD J. BLAKELY & MARY GAIL SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA:
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Many individuals are moving to subdivisions with gates and
security guards,24 primarily out of fear of crime.25 Some residents
believe that the walls around their town, in conjunction with
security checkpoints and strict entrance requirements, will
alleviate crime.26
B. Societal Influences and Motivations to "Fort-up"
Numerous rationales facilitate the move to barricaded living
boundaries. 27 Dominating the transition to gated communities is
the prevailing fear of increasing crime rates. This exigency is so
consuming that people are willing to trade some of their own
freedom for the safety and status the walls afford them. 8
GATED AND WALLED COMMUNITIES

IN THE UNITED STATES

1-2 (1995)

(researching the evolution of gated communities, their typology, and their
effect on society) [hereinafter WALLED COMMUNITIES]. Most of these gated
communities exist in Florida and California, but are starting to pop up in
other states as well. Id.
24. See GATED COMMUNITIES, supra note 8, at 1-2 (discussing the
expansion in the types of individuals who are moving to gated communities).
These walled enclaves are not just popular with retirees, movie moguls, and
Many neighborhoods are
high-powered executives, as they once were.
installing fences and guards around existing subdivisions, while other new
developments are being built with walls. Owens, supra note 8, at 1128.
25. See generally GATED COMMUNITIES, supra note 8, at 99-124 (discussing
people's motivation to deter crime); Schwartz, supra note 21, at 124-25
(discussing levels of increased security and physical barriers because of the
protection they provide through crime deterrence); Owens, supra note 8, at
1136 (discussing the rise in private policing because of growing crime rates);
Rishikof & Wohl, supra note 20, at 512 (discussing individuals turning to
private communities because of the growth in crime rates).
26. Sue Ellen Christian, Tiny Rosemont Puts its Guard Up: Gated Enclaves
Stir Controversy, CHI. TRIB., June 23, 1995, at 1 (discussing Rosemont
residents' fears and their belief that living behind walls may protect them
from crime).
27. GATED COMMUNITIES, supra note 8, at 38. Gated communities can be
divided into three general categories: lifestyle communities, prestige
Lifestyle communities
communities, and security zone communities. Id.
began as retirement communities, but now also include golf and leisure
communities. Id. at 39. These communities are marketed toward carefree
living and active lifestyles. WALLED COMMUNITIES, supra note 23, at 9.
Prestige, also called elite, communities are centered around a showing of social
The individuals attracted to these communities rely on the
status.
exclusionary aspects of gates to differentiate themselves from the common
public. Id. at 11. Security zone communities are one of the fastest growing
gated communities. These communities are usually not developed, but erect
gates on existing neighborhoods, primarily out of fear of crime. These
communities do not have the same amenities or prestige as the preceding two
classes. Id. at 14.
28. See Hidden Harbour Estates v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 181-82 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that even a regulation that is somewhat
"arbitrary," such as prohibiting the use of alcoholic beverages in a clubhouse,
will be upheld because it is common that property owners in associationcontrolled developments will have some of their freedom curtailed by the
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Customarily, these communities are gated by the residents,
not the developers. 29 Residents fence as many streets as possible
surrounding the community in an attempt to block the path of
criminal activity. 3 Average people in high crime areas have begun
erecting fences around their developments in an effort to protect
their homes and the lives within." Wealthier individuals who
reside in neighborhoods with low crime rates are erecting fences to
protect personal property and property values. 2
The community association's goal of crime prevention is
achieved through the use of private police mechanisms.3 3 Posted
at the entrance to the community are private security guards who
also patrol the streets in place of city police and neighborhood
watch programs. 34
Another overriding motivation for gated community living is
the prestige such developments boast. Prestige is bolstered by the
exclusivity of newly planned developments completely walled with
either limited or no access to non-residents.35 The communities
have strict income, class and status requirements. 6
Prestige
communities are the fastest-growing type of gated community
because residents look at the gates as a symbol of distinction
that
"create and protect a secure place on the social ladder." 37
The gates around prestige communities are also a mechanism
used to protect property values,38 while giving an air of exclusivity
and affluence.39 Prestige communities are considered by CID

majority decision).
29. GATED COMMUNITIES, supra note 8, at 99.
30. See id. at 99-100 (discussing how a fear of crime has motivated
residents "of all income levels" to gate their communities). Carri Karuhn, No
Lock Gated-Community PlanMeets Detractors in Hoffman Estates, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 14, 1999, at Al (discussing the ability of developers to charge up to 20
percent more for a home built in a gated community because of the sense of

security and privacy that the gates give).
31. See Owens, supra note 8, at 1129 (discussing the motivations of
common individuals who want to protect themselves from growing crime).
32. See Kennedy, supra note 11, at 766 (discussing wealthy individuals'

motivations to move to gated communities in the context of the exclusion it
creates).

33. Id.
34. Owens, supra note 8, at 1129. "The growth of the private security
industry mirrors the explosion in gated communities: Since 1980, the number
of security guards has risen 64% to 1.6 million, and it will reach 1.9 million by
the year 2000.

Currently, private officers outnumber public police officers

three to one." Id.
35. See Schwartz, supra note 21, at n.5.
36. WALLED COMMUNITIES, supra note 23, at 2.
37. GATED COMMUNITIES, supra note 8, at 40-41.

38. See Sterk, supra note 18, at 322-24 (finding that discrimination against
non-residents is a sustainable practice if those discriminated against are
compensated),
39. See generally GATED COMMUNITIES, supra note 8, at 75-76.
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theorists to be homogenous groups that are attempting to control
and protect their way of life separate and distinct from the rest of
the world.4"
Gated communities are quickly growing because they provide
a variety of benefits for residents.4' However, in many instances, it
is precisely these benefits that make it difficult for certain
This exclusionary effect is
individuals to become residents.
perpetuated by laws currently not designed to protect nonresidents. 2

II. PROBLEMS WITH GATED COMMUNITIES THAT SUPPORT NONRESIDENT EXCLUSION

While there are several motivations for the movement to
gated communities, there are recurring problems associated with
them. 3 A majority of the controversy arises between residents of
the community and the association that governs." However, there
40. Id. at 41. "Beyond market value, resident owners may value the sense
of community that comes with a stable neighborhood and may fear that
renters ... will interfere with that sense of community." Sterk, supra note 18,
at 323.
41. WALLED COMMUNITIES, supra note 23, at 9. A third significant impetus
GATED
that attracts people to gated communities is retirement.
COMMUNITIES, supra note 8, at 39. Most people, when they think of gated
communities, think of retirement communities. Id. Most gated retirement
communities started in Florida, but have moved to other warm climates as
well. Id. at 39-40. Retirees prefer this type of living arrangement because it
affords them with structure, recreation, and social activities. Id. at 39. Most
retirees live in California, Texas, Arizona, and Florida because of the warmer
climates. WALLED COMMUNITIES, supra note 23, at 9.
42. See discussion infra Part II(B) explaining several laws that perpetuate
gated community exclusion.
43. PRIVATOPIA, supra note 8, at 9. One problem is that exclusive
community developments were built with deed restrictions. Id. Homeowners'
associations were created to enforce these restrictive covenants. Id. Problems
with the covenants began to occur with racially restrictive covenants. Id. In
1948, the U.S. Supreme Court held that state courts could not enforce racially
restrictive land use agreements between neighbors. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1, 22 (1948). In Shelley, the United States Supreme Court stated:
Nor do we find merit in the suggestion that property owners who are
parties to these agreements are denied equal protection of the laws if
denied access to the courts to enforce the terms of restrictive covenants
and to assert property rights which the state courts have held to be
created by such [racially restrictive] agreements.
Id.
44. Residents and associations have litigated issues involving consensual
contractual agreements, restrictive covenants, and harsh association
regulations. Contractual relations between residents and associations have
been known to restrict freedom. Kennedy, supra note 11, at 762-63. However,
"not all those who encounter their respective provisions necessarily consent to
them." Owens, supra note 8, at 1136. Contracts for CID's may be considered
adhesion contracts that necessitate government intervention. McKenzie,
supra note 8, at 400. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. at 4-5, is an example of
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are also burgeoning problems created by gated communities,
which have been fairly free from judicial intervention. 4 Only in
the past three years have legal scholars begun to explore the
ramifications of gated communities on non-residents. Some of
these problems include income requirements that create
segregation, First and Fourth Amendment issues, and nonresidents' loss of the benefits of public property.
A. Income Requirements and Wealth Classifications
Although economic barriers in housing development are not
novel concepts, the addition of physical barriers is new.46 Physical
barriers are erected to exclude many groups of people from gated
community developments.47 This exclusion creates "a private
world that shares little with its neighbors or the larger political

litigation involving a restrictive covenant. In Shelley, the Court was faced
with a restrictive covenant that said:
[NJo part of said property or any portion thereof shall be, for said term of
[flifty-years, occupied by any person not of the Caucasian race, it being
intended hereby to restrict the use of said property for said period of
time against the occupancy as owners or tenants of any portion of said
property for resident or other purpose by people of the Negro or
Mongolian Race.
Id. The Court held the covenant that restricted solely on the basis of race to
be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 23. For examples of cases involving harsh association regulations, see
Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 878 P.2d 1275, 1290
(Cal. 1994) (upholding condominium association's "no pet" restriction because
the restriction was presumptively reasonable, and plaintiff failed to prove that
the restriction was arbitrary, or that it affected a fundamental right because
there was no right conferred by state or constitutional law to keep pets); Board
of Dir. of 175 East Delaware Place Homeowners Ass'n v. Hinojosa, 679 N.E.2d
407, 411 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that condominium association's rule that
barred dogs was reasonable because recreational areas for dogs were scarce,
there was a grandfather clause for existing dogs, and less restrictive measures
to protect against the harm from dogs had failed in the past). See also Riss v.
Angel, 934 P.2d 669, 677 (Wash. 1997) (en banc) (holding that a consent to
construct a covenant that required "conformity and harmony of external
design and general quality with the existing standards of the neighborhood"
must be reasonable).
45. See WALLED COMMUNITIES supra note 23, at 3. "Scholarly work on
gated communities is essentially non-existent." Id. See also Citizens Against
Gated Enclaves v. Whitley Heights Civic Ass'n, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 451, 457 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the city did not have authority to abandon public
streets for the benefit of a private community that wanted to erect gates to
restrict use by non-residents).
46. See WALLED COMMUNITIES, supra note 23, at 2.

47. GATED COMMUNITIES, supra note 8, at 8. Gated communities differ
from condo associations in that the developments control more than just
private space. WALLED COMMUNITIES, supra note 23, at 2. "[T]hey privatize
community space, not merely individual space. Many of these communities
also privatize civic responsibilities such as police protection and communal
services such as schools, recreation, and entertainment." Id.
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system. This fragmentation undermines the very concept of...
community life."48
Community associations and real estate developers keep
individuals out by enacting strict prerequisites to buying property
in gated communities. Prerequisites are promulgated by the
association, either by deed or majority-enacted property
restrictions.49 Anyone who does not meet the requirements is
excluded.
The most notable and common prerequisites are stringent
income requirements. The potential owner must meet the income
requirement before buying property in the gated community.
Income requirements typically far exceed the amount of income
necessary to afford the property." Many communities also require
substantial assets in excess of income requirements. In addition
to inflated income requirements and asset portfolios, most gated
communities require prescreening of potential owners by board
members.
Consequently, through such established requirements, the
communities are enforcing class restrictions based on arbitrary
wealth requirements. At the same time, the community board,
made up of property owners and developers, establish barriers for
potential buyers. 5' Barriers arbitrarily exclude those who have the
ability to afford the property, but do not fit the profile of what the

48. WALLED COMMUNITIES, supra note 23, at 2.
49. See, e.g., East Delaware Place Homeowners Ass'n, 679 N.E.2d at 409-10
(stating that "condominiums are creatures of statute and, thus, any action
taken on behalf of the condominium must be authorized by statute"). Id. at
409. An example of such a statute indicates that the condominium board may:
"adopt and amend rules and regulations covering the details of the operation
and use of the property, after a meeting of the unit owners called for the
specific purpose of discussing the proposed rules and regulations." 765 ILL.
CoMP. STAT. ANN. 605/18.4(h) (West 1994). The Illinois statute also allows
the creation of "such other lawful provisions not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act as the owner or owners may deem desirable in order to
promote and preserve the cooperative aspect of ownership of the property and
to facilitate the proper administration thereof." 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
605/4(i) (West 1994).
50. See
Quicken Mortgage.com
(last modified
Dec.
1,
1999)
<http://mortgage.quicken.com/help/affordcalchow.asp>. The mortgage industry
uses one of two standard formulas that estimate how much an individual can
afford to pay for her home: the housing-expense ratio and the debt-to-incomeratio. Id. The housing-expense ratio standard concludes that monthly house
payments (including taxes and insurance) should not exceed 28% of gross
monthly income. Id. The debt-to-income ratio determines an individual's total
monthly home payment plus repayment on other loans or credit cards, which
should not exceed 36% of gross monthly income. Id.
51. "The developer possesses nearly absolute control over the community,"
in the way of making laws and restrictions for residents and potential buyers.
Uriel Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43
U. CHI.L. REv. 253, 286 (1976).
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community is looking for. 2
Gated communities "erode a sense of community and divide
people by age, race and class." 3 Large families and minorities
have traditionally been known to have exceedingly lower
disposable incomes than the majority."
Therefore, wealth
classifications have a greater negative effect on minorities and
large families.
The consequence is that through the
implementation of inflated income restrictions, gated communities
are succeeding in keeping out minorities and large families. This
serves to segregate the gated community into its residents' own
independently composed private neighborhood.55
More community planners should oppose inflated income
requirements. Inflated income requirements create a barrier to
diverse community development because of their segregating
nature.56 In addition to the income requirements, the privatization
of communities takes advantage of several existing laws that
support exclusion.
B. PrivatizationAffects the FirstAmendment, the Fourth
Amendment, and Non-Residents' Use of FormerPublic Property
Gated communities take advantage of their private nature.
By gating an entire community, including streets and parks, what
was once public property becomes private. This privatization 7 of
former public areas creates several problems.
The first problem is the First Amendment issue of freedom of
speech. 8 Since the 1939 decision in Hague v. CIO,59 the U. S.
52. The "profile" means substantial asset portfolios, inflated income
requirements, and arbitrary standards set for passing prescreening meetings.
53. Christian, supra note 26, at 1 (quoting an architect and other experts
who oppose gated communities because of their disruptive effect on
heterogeneous diverse communities).
54. See generally U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING.

55. Christian, supra note 26, at 1.
56. Kennedy, supra note 11, at 771 (discussing how gated community
exclusion may lead to racial steering).
57. See Ross, supra note 9, at 801 (discussing how "[p]rivatization involves
the shift from government provision of functions and services to provision by

the private sector."). This privatization blurs the line between a public and a
private function. Id.
58. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

59. 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939). In Hague, the United States Supreme
Court stated:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of
the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
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Supreme Court has consistently held that streets and parks are
held "in trust" to the public for communication and assembly.
Streets and parks have traditionally been open to the public for
the exercise of free speech." Not so in gated communities. With
the privatization of gated communities, the streets and parks are
no longer "in trust" for the public; they are privately owned.
Therefore, the community can enact rules that exclude the
exercise of free speech of non-residents on the streets and in the
parks within the community walls.6
Second, the walls create barriers to non-residents' travel and
use of the streets.62 Streets once open to the public for use as
thoroughfares are no longer available after the community installs
gates surrounding the area. To have access to the streets, nonresidents are subject to questioning by the community's private
security. Non-residents of a gated community are sometimes
"unfairly harassed or unjustifiably asked to leave [the community]
because of their race or class."63 This questioning poses the issue
60. See Laguna Publ'g Co. v. Golden Rain Found. of Laguna Hills, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 813, 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that it was a state constitutional
violation of free speech to exclude a newspaper from a gated community,
where only resident-approved access was permitted, because another
newspaper had been allowed); William G. Mulligan Found. v. Brooks, 711 A.2d
961, 967 (N.J. 1998) (holding that a gated community does not have to allow a
non-resident to speak on the common ground of the property when property is
for nondiscriminatory private use only).
61. William G. Mulligan Found., 711 A.2d at 964. In discussing the right to
free speech in a gated community where the association forbids outsiders, the
New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
In balancing the rights of speech and assembly upon private property
and the extent to which such property owners can reasonably restrict
those rights, the Court adopted a three-part test which requires
consideration of 1) the nature, purpose, and primary use of such private
property; 2) the extent and nature of the public's invitation to use that
property; and 3) the purpose of the expressional activity undertaken
upon such property in relation to both the private and public use of the
property. Even when an owner of private property is constitutionally
obligated to honor speech and assembly rights of others, the owner is
entitled to fashion reasonable rules and regulations to control the time,
mode, opportunity and site for the individual exercise of expressional
rights on the property. In this regard, consideration must also be given
to whether there exists convenient and feasible alternative means to
individuals to engage in substantially the same expressional activity.
Id.
62. See Citizens Against Gated Enclaves v. Whitley Heights Civic Ass'n, 28
Cal. Rptr. 2d 451, 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (explaining the formation of
Citizens Against Gated Enclaves (CAGE), a non-resident group opposed to
gating a California subdivision because the citizens were being stopped from
using public streets and sidewalks for commuting and jogging). See also
William G. Mulligan Found., 711 A.2d at 965 (describing property in a gated
community that resembles public property, but cannot be used by nonresidents).
63. Kennedy, supra note 11, at 771. Some gated communities even charge
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of possible violations of the Fourth Amendment" right to be free
from illegal search and seizure."
Third, local ordinances may affect non-residents' use of
former public property. Local ordinances govern the city's ability
to abandon public streets that are no longer in use." Many of
these ordinances exist for the sole benefit of aiding communities in
their efforts to gate up.6 7 When a city abandons public streets,
non-residents lose the use and benefit of once public property.!
Citizens Against Gated Enclaves v. Whitley Heights Civic
Ass'n69 was the first and only case to reach a state appellate court
where non-residents successfully challenged the practices of a
gated community on state or federal law grounds.7 ° In Citizens
non-residents a fee to enter the community. Id. (discussing Sea Pines
Plantation, an exclusive gated community in Hilton Head, South Carolina that
charges a $3 entry fee for pedestrian access to the property).
64. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

65. See Owens, supra note 8, at 1142-49 (proposing making private security
accountable to constitutional principles because of its public function by
overturning Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921), which holds that the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to private party searches); Schwartz, supra
note 21, at 128-31 (discussing search and seizure implications of securitygated entrance to a Rosemont, Illinois housing community). Private security
guards wear uniforms and badges, and carry guns. Therefore, they often
resemble public police officers. However, the law treats them as private
individuals who have no greater enforcement capacities than average citizens.
Owens, supra note 8, at 1129. Because of the growth of police privatization, it
is argued that the Fourth Amendment should apply to private security guards.
Id. at 1144-45.
66. See generally City of Oakland v. Oakland Water Front Co., 124 P. 251,
253 (1912) (giving the state legislature permission to vacate a street and
delegate that power to the city where the street had not been used by the
public); Cal. [Sts. & High.] Code §§ 8300-8363 & 955-960.5 (West 1998)
(outlining a municipality's ability to abandon public streets).
67. See Citizens Against Gated Enclaves v. Whitley Heights Civic Ass'n., 28
Cal. Rptr. 2d 451, 452 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (depicting an unsuccessful attempt
by a community to erect gates solely for its own benefit, while ignoring the loss
of use by non-residents).
68. Id. at 453. See Christian, supra note 26, at 1. "In Rosemont... the
local government has gated the only two streets, which are public, leading into
a public subdivision and posted village police officers at the checkpoints 24
hours a day, all paid with public funds." Id. There have been several
complaints about the Rosemont situation, but as of yet there has been no
noted case disputing the city's power to close off the streets. Oddly, the
Rosemont barriers are still up, the public streets have been abandoned to the
private association, and the auxiliary police at the gates are still employed and
paid by the city of Rosemont, out of all Rosemont citizen's tax dollars.
Telephone Interview with Supervisor, Rosemont Police Department (Oct. 5,
1999).
69. 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 451, 452 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
70. Both Laguna Publ'g Co. v. Golden Rain Found. of Laguna Hills, 182
Cal. Rptr. 813 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982), and William G. Mulligan Found. v. Brooks,
711 A.2d 961, 967 (N.J. 1998), addressed constitutional free speech issues in
gated communities.
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Against Gated Enclaves, the California Court of Appeals decided
whether the city of Los Angeles could withdraw a street from
public use to benefit private homeowners.7' The Whitley Heights
homeowners erected gates operating "in a manner so as to exclude
members of the public from streets in violation of the vehicle
code." 72

Non-residents of the community argued that they were

being excluded from using streets and thoroughfares for recreation
and travel purposes.7 ' The court held that the city could authorize
closing a street if the street was no longer needed for traffic, but
could not close it for any other purpose.7 ' The court held that the
public streets could not be abandoned because they were still in
use by the citizens of Whitley Heights. 3
Citizens Against Gated Enclaves illustrates how homeowners'

associations attempt to have streets abandoned so they can erect
gates to restrict access to the public. However, as the case
demonstrates, the state must meet the burden of showing that a
street is no longer needed before it can successfully withdraw the
street from public use." Despite the holding in Citizens Against
Gated Enclaves, many cities have been successful in meeting this
burden for the purpose of gating communities.
By abandoning public streets, the cities have had a hand in
excluding non-residents.77 After blocking both the entrance and
exits of the community with gates, security or street closures, the
community has, in a sense, succeeded in segregating itself from
the diversity of the surrounding neighborhood.
Non-residents affected by a gated community's exclusion are
limited in their opportunities to seek redress. There are two ways
to access the judicial system for grievances against gated
communities. The first is with a constitutional cause of action; the
second is with a statutory cause of action. As we will see, neither
is currently adequate to deal effectively with the problem of
71.
72.
73.
74.

Citizens Against Gated Enclaves, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 452.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 455. In dictum, the court expressed the public policy reason for

the holding:
Although we understand the deep and abiding concern of the City and
appellant with crime prevention and historic preservation, we doubt the
Legislature wants to permit a return to feudal times with each suburb
being a fiefdom to which other citizens of the State are denied their
fundamental right of access to use public streets within those areas.
Id. at 457.
75. Id.
76. Citizens Against Gated Enclaves, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 454.
77. See generally Christian, supra note 26, at 1. For example, in Rosemont
a public street was closed to through traffic in order to gate the only single-

family residential subdivision in town. Id. The city also pays the wages of
security personnel at the entry. Id. Here, Rosemont has had a hand in the

exclusion of non-residents of the community in two ways. Id.

The John Marshall Law Review

[34:379

exclusion.

III. A NON-RESIDENT CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST GATED
COMMUNITY EXCLUSION

Exclusion practiced by gated communities creates a
discriminatory effect on non-residents.78 There are two options
open to non-residents who attempt to redress the discrimination.
The first of these two approaches is the constitutional cause of
action. However, the constitutional cause of action has its
limitations because of burdens a plaintiff must overcome." When
a non-resident is unable to adequately protect herself within
current constitutional frameworks, she has available a statutory
cause of action under the FHA."° The FHA protects certain classes
of persons against discrimination in housing. Similar to the
constitutional cause of action, the FHA also has requirements that
must be met before a person can successfully maintain a cause of
action against a gated community.
A. The ConstitutionalCause of Action
In the past four years, legal scholars have begun to analyze
the constitutional implications of gated communities. Gated
communities create two constitutional issues: 1) Fourth
Amendment8 1 issues of unconstitutional search and seizure at
guarded entrances, 2 and 2) Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection violations" arising from exclusionary practices.8 4 Even
78. See discussion supra Part II(A) and discussion infra Part III(B)(3) for
an explanation of the discriminatory effects that strict income requirements
have on potential buyers, most notably minorities and large families.

79. See discussion infra Part III(A) for an explanation of the state action
requirements for a constitutional cause of action.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1999).
81. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Id.
82. See

Owens,

supra note

8, at

1129.

As the

gated

community

phenomenon grows, so too will constitutional implications. It is yet to be
determined if illegal search and seizure issues of the Fourth Amendment will
apply to private security hired to provide policing functions normally left to

city officers. Id. at 1130. See also Schwartz, supra note 21, at 126 (discussing
several of the implications that arise from constitutional violations of the
Fourth Amendment at gated community checkpoints and arguing for applying
the Fourth Amendment to these private actors because they are taking on a
governmental function of policing).
83. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
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with recent scholarly work on the subject, none of these issues has
actually been litigated.85
Recently, the privatization of land-use controls has taken over
former governmental responsibilities of law-making and policing.86
This system of private governance has been considered "the most
extreme form of private land-use control,"" because gated
community associations take over the provision of many services
once provided for by the government.8 8
Gated community
activities are presumptively private, and many CID theorists
believe that the government should not interfere. 8 However,
when gated communities discriminate against non-residents, the
issue is no longer private; it becomes a public policy issue. This
public-private dichotomy blurs the lines of what is and is not a
governmental responsibility. °
In order for a non-resident to maintain a constitutional cause
of action for gated community exclusion, the community must be a

State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Id.
84. See discussion infra Part II(A) for an explanation of how wealth
classifications are exclusionary.
85. See Laguna Publ'g Co. v. Golden Rain Found. of Laguna Hills, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 813, 844 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that limiting the free speech of a
non-resident newspaper was dependent on permitting another newspaper
company on the property). See also William G. Mulligan Found. v. Brooks,
711 A.2d 961, 966 (N.J. 1998) (allowing the exclusion of a non-resident's right
to free speech on private gated community property). See Owens, supra note
8, at 1129 (discussing the need for constitutional inquiry into Fourth
Amendment illegal search and seizure issues).
86. See id.; McKenzie, supra note 8, at 399.
87. Ross, supra note 9, at 801-02 (describing the problems when gated
subdivisions, where deed restrictions and covenants control property use, and
services are provided through a private homeowners' association, are "the
most extreme form of private land-use control").
88. Id.
89. McKenzie, supra note 8, at 402 (explaining but not agreeing with the
theory that "[there is something essentially 'private' about decisions to
construct, sell, purchase, and operate CIDs.
Government should
presumptively remain uninvolved in the contractual relationships [of CID's]").
90. See id. at 403. There are three dimensions to the public-private
dichotomy: agency, access and interest.
A thing may be relatively public on one dimension and relatively private
on another ... So, to be fully 'public' something would be governmental.
Open to all, and of concern to all. To be fully private, a thing would be
non-governmental, closed and of no concern to any, but one or a few.
Id. See also Rishikof & Wohl, supra note 20, at 528 (citing Reichman, supra
note 51, at 255-56). There are many largely public aspects or "governmental"
features of community associations. But most believe that "these entities are
nevertheless of a 'private' nature, because they are based on private initiative,
private money, private property and private law concepts." Id.
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state actor. 91 The courts have found that private parties meet the
state action requirement only on very limited bases.92
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has been the only federal
appellate court to hold that a private landlord met the Fourteenth
Amendment's state action requirement, which allowed the plaintiff
94
93
to survive a motion to dismiss. In Halet v. Wend Investment Co.,
one count of the plaintiffs cause of action was against a private
landlord for racial discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause. 9
The plaintiff alleged that: the landlord leased the
apartment complex land from the County; the County leased the
land for the benefit of providing public housing; the County had
control and oversaw all plan development, uses and purposes of
the apartment, and the rent charged; and the landlord paid a
percentage of rent to the County.96
Citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,97 the court
reversed the district court's dismissal of the action.99 The Court of
Appeals held that there were sufficient facts to demonstrate the
government's
"position
of
interdependence"
and
"joint
participa[tion]" with the landlord, which led to a finding that there
was a "significant relationship" that made the private party a
state actor. 99
Gated community developments are part of a planned
development project sited on a parcel of private land, not owned by
the government.'09 The government is not involved in the control

91. See generally WILLIAM COHEN AND JONATHAN
D. VARAT,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 1127-28 (10th ed. 1998). To be

considered a state actor a party must meet one of three requirements: 1)
government qua government, where a governmental entity is acting as itself,
i.e. state as state; 2) the party is a subdivision of government acting; or 3) a
private party is acting in lieu of government, under one of three theories. Id.

The three theories are: 1) public function, where a private party is performing
a function that is traditionally performed only by the government 2)

entanglement, where a private party is so entangled with the government that
it can be treated as the government, also called the "symbiotic relationship"
test (see Kennedy, supra note 11, at 785) or 3) encourage and foster, where the

government must encourage or foster the discrimination, by allowing it to
continue or requiring the private party to do an act. COHEN & VARAT, supra,
at 1127-28.
92. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 720 (1961)
(holding a coffee shop owner to be a state actor because the government owned
the building his shop was in, and was presumptively aware of the owner's
practices when he discriminated against black patrons).
93. Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1310 (9th Cir. 1982).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1309.
96. Id. at 1310.
97. 365 U.S. 715, 720 (1961).
98. Id.
99. Halet, 672 F.2d at 1310.
100. WALLED COMMUNITIES, supra note 23, at 5.
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of the project beyond common zoning and licensing requirements.
Therefore, gated communities are sufficiently distinguishable from
the facts in Halet, in which the court found that there was a
"significant relationship" between the government and a private
party.
Courts are unlikely to find that gated residential
communities under private ownership are state actors because of
their private nature.
Without meeting the "significant
relationship" test, an Equal Protection claim against a gated
community will fail to meet the state action requirement needed to
sustain the cause of action.0 1
The current constitutional requirements are unable to
address the exclusionary impact that gated communities have on
non-residents.' °
For the government to control non-resident
discrimination, there must be an ability to hold private
communities accountable for their actions."' The constitutional
cause of action will not be sufficient to lessen a gated community's
discriminatory effects on non-residents. Therefore, a legislative
theory is the only option that remains to govern gated community
restrictions." 4

101. Compare Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. at 720 (finding a
significant relationship is needed for a private party to meet the state action
requirement for a constitutional cause of action).
102. There is a further barrier to Equal Protection analysis of gated
communities when exclusion is based primarily upon income requirements. In
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, (1973), the
U. S. Supreme Court held that "at least where wealth is involved, the Equal
Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal
advantages." Id. at 24. The Court has held that income is not a suspect class
that is afforded strict scrutiny by the courts in an equal protection
constitutional cause of action. Id.
In Rodriguez, the Court dealt with the issue of a Texas school system
financing legislation that discriminated against poor persons, indigent
persons, and those persons residing in poorer school districts. Id. at 19-20.
The cause of action was a violation under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The court did not find that income level was a
suspect class that required strict scrutiny by the courts. Id. at 25-26.
The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none
of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with
such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process.
Id. at 28. Therefore, gated community exclusion falls short of maintaining a
cause of action when analyzed under the Equal Protection Clause.
103. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). The Fourteenth Amendment
'erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or
wrongful." Id.
104. See Kennedy, supra note 11, at 778 (stating that there are social
consequences from the fact that most residential policies are never subject to
judicial review).
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B. The Statutory Cause of Action under the FHA
Congress enacted the FHA... to alleviate discrimination in the
sale and rental of housing.'
To prove a claim of housing
discrimination under Title VIII, the plaintiff can advance
one of
01 7
two theories: disparate treatment or disparate impact.
1. A PrimaFacie Case of Disparate TreatmentRequires Intent to
DiscriminateAgainst a Protected Class
Disparate treatment can be proved by showing that a housing
practice was motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose,108
with evidence of either direct or indirect intentional
discrimination."°9 There is a four-part requirement for showing a
prima facie case of disparate treatment. First, the plaintiff must
show that she is a member of a protected class. Next, the plaintiff
must show that she was qualified to buy. The plaintiff must then
prove that she was denied or refused sale, and lastly, that the
housing remained available."'

105. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1999). The Federal Fair Housing Act (FHA)
prohibits discrimination in the sale and rental of housing based upon seven
statutorily protected classes. Id. Section 3604(a)-(d) denotes what type of
conduct is specifically prohibited:
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to
refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make
unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color,
religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or
facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex,
familial status, or national origin.
(c) To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or
published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the
sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial
status, or national origin, or an intention to make any such preference,
limitation, or discrimination.
(d) To represent to any person because of race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin that any dwelling is not
available for inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so
available.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(d) (1999).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 3601.
107. Kormoczy v. Secretary of HUD, 53 F.3d 821, 823-24 (7th Cir. 1995)
(describing the difference between disparate treatment and disparate impact
as causes of action for housing discrimination under the FHA).
108. Id. Cf. Betsey v. Turtle Creek Ass'n, 736 F.2d 983, 986 (4th Cir. 1984)
(finding that disparate treatment need not be shown if there is an alternative
showing of a disproportionate impact on minorities in the total group to which
the discriminatory rental practice was applied).
109. Kormoczy, 53 F.3d at 824.
110. See Phiffer v. Proud Parrot Motor Hotel, Inc., 648 F.2d 548, 551 (9th
Cir. 1980) (requiring four factors for a prima facie case of discrimination);
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A non-resident of a gated community must meet the protected
member status to have a cause of action for discriminatory
housing practices. In Boyd v. Lefrak Organization,"' the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals refused to accept a theory that income
was the functional equivalent of race, relying on its interpretation
of the 1971 U.S. Supreme Court decision in James v. Valtierra."'
The issue in Boyd concerned eligibility rates for the rental of
housing that was based on income levels of prospective renters.
The court did not find the correlation between income and race to
be sufficient to prove discriminatory treatment of a protected
class.113 Therefore, the court held that a private landlord did not
have a duty to accept low-income tenants because there was no
proof that the neutral income requirements were aimed at
excluding racial minorities."'
Disparate treatment would be a difficult theory on which to
base a discrimination cause of action for a non-resident of a gated
community. Gated community requirements have the effect of
discriminating based on income level, and low-income level is not
one of the seven protected classes covered by the FHA.11' Sellers
retain their ability to discriminate against individuals who do not
fall within one of the protected classifications. This discrimination
Wharton v. Knefel, 562 F.2d 550, 553-54 (8th Cir. 1977) (requiring that all
four elements be met in order to meet the plaintiffs prima facie case of
disparate treatment); Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc. 610 F.2d 1032, 1038
(2d Cir. 1979) (finding that a prima facie case of racial discrimination could
not be defeated by hypothetical business reasons). Cf. McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (originating the four-part test for a
prima facie case of discriminatory treatment in employment discrimination
Title VII cases).
111. 509 F.2d 1110, 1113 (2d Cir. 1975).
112. 402 U.S. 137, 142 (1971). In Valtierra, the U. S. Supreme Court decided
the constitutionality of a state statute that made provisions for community
referenda for the building of low-income housing. Id. at 144-45. The Court
decided that there is no fundamental right to housing. Id. The dissent in
Valtierra argues that the state statute constitutes invidious discrimination by
singling out low-income individuals to bear its burden. Id. The Boyd dissent
agrees, arguing that the majority's reliance on Valtierra is misplaced because
it was decided on constitutional grounds and not based on income
discrimination. Boyd, 509 F.2d at 1116-17.
113. Boyd, 509 F.2d at 1113. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
The fact that differentiation in eligibility rates for defendants'
apartments is correlated with race proves merely that minorities tend to
be poorer than is the general population. In order to utilize this
correlation to establish a violation of the Fair Housing Act on the part of
a private landlord, plaintiffs would have to show that there existed some
demonstrable prejudicial treatment of minorities over and above that
which is the inevitable result of disparity in income.
Id.
114. Id.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (1999). The seven protected classes are: race, color,
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, and national origin. Id.
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is justified by a desire to protect property values as well as the
character of particular neighborhoods." 6 This has left questions
open for the courts when an individual is kept out of a particular
type of housing based on a non-protected distinction.
The reasoning used by the court in Boyd to support the
holding that income could not show a sufficient correlation to
racial discrimination to support a fair housing claim 1 7 was rejected
by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 1988. In Huntington
Branch, NAACP v. Huntington,"8 the court discounted the Boyd
holding because it had refused to apply the disparate impact
analysis.
The Second Circuit stated that it will apply the
disparate impact analysis when a plaintiff challenges a facially
neutral rule." 9
2. A PrimaFacie Case of DisparateImpact
The disparate impact test is an easier burden for a nonresident's cause of action against a gated community's terms,
policies, or privileges"' because it does not require a showing of the
defendant's intent to discriminate."'
A plaintiff may prove

116. See Sterk, supra note 18, at 322-24 (discussing in part how residents
feel discrimination against non-residents of their community is warranted
where it maintains the market value of their property and the character of
their neighborhood).
117. Boyd, 509 F.2d at 1115-18. The majority's requirement that there be
direct evidence of racial discrimination in order to establish a FHA claim was
vehemently argued against by the dissent. Id. at 1115. Justice Mansfield
argued that basing a FHA violation on a requirement of direct evidence of
racially discriminatory motive or intent was incorrect. Id. "This case should
be governed by the principle ... that, where a facially neutral practice has a
serious and substantial de facto discriminatory impact, it prima facie violates
a statutory prohibition against racial discrimination unless the alleged
violator can show that the practice is necessary for non-racial reasons." Id.
118. 844 F.2d 926, 934 (2d Cir. 1988).
119. Id. at 935.
"Often [facially neutral] rules bear no relation to
discrimination upon passage, but develop into powerful discriminatory
mechanisms when applied." Id. The court argues that if the intent was
required for a showing of discrimination under the FHA it would "strip the
statute of all impact on de facto segregation." Id. at 934.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1999).
121. See Mountain Side Mobile v. Secretary of HUD, 56 F.3d 1243, 1251
(10th Cir. 1995) (stating that without a deliberate motive to discriminate, a
policy "may in operation be functionally equivalent to intentional
discrimination"); Pfaff v. U.S. Dep't Hous., 88 F.3d 739, 745-46 (9th Cir. 1996)
(adhering to the law in other jurisdictions, which does not require intent for a
prima facie case of disparate impact); U.S. v. Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176, 1178-79
(8th Cir. 1992) (holding intent requirement only necessary in a disparate
treatment cause of action, not in a disparate impact cause of action); Resident
Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146-48 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding no showing
of intent required for a disparate impact cause of action); Huntington Branch,
NAACP v. Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934-35 (2d Cir. 1988) (arguing that
requiring direct intent to discriminate would defeat the purpose of the FHA),
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disparate impact by showing that a policy or practice that is
outwardly neutral, or neutral on its face, has a discriminatory
effect on an individual in a protected class, because
of its
122
disproportionate adverse impact on that class member.
In Pfaff v. U.S. Department of Housing, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals articulated a two-part test for a prima facie case
of disparate impact.'23
First, the plaintiff must identify an
outwardly neutral housing policy or restriction. Second, the
plaintiff must demonstrate a significant or adverse impact on a
particular protected class produced by the facially neutral policy or
restriction.' 4
In Pfaff, the landlord had an occupancy restriction on a rental
unit that could only accommodate a family of four because of the
units size.' 2 ' The policy was outwardly neutral because the
decision was not based on familial status, but on space
limitations.'2 6 However, even though the policy was outwardly
neutral, the Ninth Circuit held that the restriction
disproportionately impacted families with children.'27 Therefore,
aff'd in part 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam).
122. See Mountain Side Mobile, 56 F.3d at 1252 (adopting the analysis that
"disparate impact claims are based on policies and practices that are without a
discriminatory motive but are functionally equivalent to intentional
discrimination"); Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 745 (explaining that discriminatory effect
"describes conduct that actually or predictably result[s] in discrimination" and
is shown by an adverse or disproportionate impact on a protected group);
Betsey v. Turtle Creek Ass'n, 736 F.2d 983, 986 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that a
landlord's housing practice may violate Title VIII either by being motivated by
racial discrimination or because it is shown to have a disproportionate impact
on minorities). See also U.S. v. Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir.
1974) (holding that a plaintiff need not show that the action resulting in racial
discrimination was racially motivated in order to prove a prima facie case of
housing discrimination).
123. Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 745 (adopting analysis from an analogous context in
Palmer v. United States, 794 F.2d 534, 538 (9th Cir. 1986); in Palmer, the
court used the two-part disparate impact test to analyze a claim of age
discrimination in employment).
Cf. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v.
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977) (articulating a
different test for disparate impact that has not been as pervasive as Pfaff).
The four critical factors are: 1) How strong is the plaintiffs showing of
discriminatory effect; 2) Is there some evidence of discriminatory intent; 3)
What is the defendant's interest in taking the action complained of; and 4)
Does the plaintiff seek to compel the defendant to affirmatively provide
housing for members of minority groups or merely restrain the defendant from
interfering with individual property owners who wish to provide such
housing). Id. But cf. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 844 F.2d at 935-36
(refusing to adopt the Arlington Heights test for a prima facie case of disparate
treatment because the factors are to be considered in a final determination on
the merits, not in the prima facie requirement).
124. Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 745.
125. Id. at 742.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 745.
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even if a policy is facially neutral,' 8 in that it purports to treat all
individuals the same, the policy can still be a violation of the FHA
by its disparate impact on protected classes." 9
3.

Income Requirements and DisproportionateImpact

This Comment has suggested that the income requirements
instituted by gated communities are exclusionary based on wealth
classifications. 3 ' However, wealth is not one of the protected
classes. 1
The disparate impact analysis covers the
disproportionate impact that income requirements have on
protected classes.
Income requirements for home-buying are established by two
standard mortgage lending practices, which estimate that housing
payments should not exceed 28-36% of an individual's gross
monthly income.'32 Income requirements for buying property in a
gated community go far beyond this standard calculation.
Associations are looking to profile potential buyers in an effort to
maintain the homogeneous character of their neighborhoods.
Developers also charge up to 20% more for property in a gated
community. '
In one particular proposed Illinois community,
developers estimated selling homes for a base price of $250,000.134
The median price for homes in the area is $179,000, which is 30%
less. In Illinois, the U. S. Census for 1990 shows that Whites, with
a high school degree or more, earn 20-30% more than Blacks and
Hispanics.'
128. U.S. v. Yonkers Board of Education, 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1371-72
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding that even though the decision as to where to site
subsidized housing is facially neutral, an inference of discriminatory effect can
be established circumstantially from repeated acts of opposition to the

housing).
129. Id.; Fair Housing Council of Orange County v. Ayres, 855 F. Supp. 315,
318 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that a landlord may establish reasonable policies
as to the requirements necessary to rent an apartment, however, the
requirements must not be discriminatory to a protected class member in its
terms or conditions).

130. See discussion supra Part II(A) for an explanation of the exclusionary
effects of wealth classifications on non-residents of gated communities.
131. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (1999); discussion supra Part III(B)(1) (stating
that wealth is not one of the protected classes under the FHA).
132. See Quicken Mortgage.com (last modified
Dec.
1, 1999)
<http://mortgage.quicken.com/ help/affordcalchow.asp>.
133. See Karuhn, supra note 30, at Al.
134. See id.
135. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1990 CENSUS OF
POPULATION AND HOUSING.

AGE

WHITE (M)

HIsPANIc (M)

BLACK (M)

25-29

$31,115

$27,145

$27,341

30-34
35-44
45-54

$40,388
$49,502
$59,989

$34,799

$29,471
$35,866
$41,187

$42,193
47,281
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Charging 20% more for housing in an area where a particular
race earns 20-30% more than minorities can extinguish the ability
of minorities to afford the property. Additionally, setting the
income requirements even higher than the standard mortgage
calculations virtually ensures a homogeneous community.
Consequently, creating prerequisites to establish a particular class
of residency has a disproportionate effect on minorities."6
Under the FHA, the disproportionate effect inflated income
requirements have on protected classes should be analyzed under
a disparate impact theory.137 After a non-resident plaintiff meets
the burden of proving a prima facie case of disparate impact, the
burden shifts and provides the defendant with an opportunity to
show "some legitimate non-discriminatory reason" for the policy.'
A defendant must present legitimate business reasons'39 why the
facially neutral practice or policy is in effect.

55-64

$58,656

$48,910

$37,653

AGE
25-29
30-34
35-44
45-54
55-64

WHITE (F)
$23,814
$28,271
$29,730
$28,179
$27,231

HISPANIC (F)
$21,655
$25,392
$26,988
$29,546
$25,320

BLACK (F)
$21,562
$25,740
$28,282
$27,186
$25,528

136. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283,
1290-91 (7th Cir. 1977). However, the use of national statistics would not be
the appropriate measure for local housing statistics in a showing of disparate
impact. Mountain Side Mobile Estates v. Secretary of HUD, 56 F.3d 1243,
1253 (10th Cir. 1995). Local housing statistics would be necessary in an
actual cause of action. Id. They are used here merely for example purposes.
137. Even if the courts do not find that such statistics sufficiently show a
significant impact on minorities to meet the prima facie requirements, there
are two types of discriminatory effects caused by a facially neutral policy. One
is when a policy has a greater adverse impact on one racial group over
another, as shown above. The second is the harmful effect the policy or
practice has on the surrounding community. If the policy has the effect of
perpetuating segregation, it will be considered invidious under the FHA
regardless of the impact on particular racial groups. Pfaff v. U.S. Dep't Hous.,
88 F.3d 739, 746 (9th Cir. 1996); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Huntington,
844 F.2d. 926, 937 (2d. Cir. 1988). The outside community that surrounds a
gated community that has a large concentration of minorities will be harmed
by the segregating effect of gated communities. Huntington, 844 F.2d. at 938.
138. Huntington, 844 F.2d. at 936 (arguing that the second step in the
burden-shifting requirement weighs the discriminatory effect against the
defendant's business justifications). See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (applying the first use of the burden-shifting test in a
discrimination cause of action for employment discrimination actions).
139. See Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 749 (preserving the economic value of property was
held to be a legitimate business reason for an occupancy restriction even
though it was shown that it had a discriminatory effect on families).
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THE NEED FOR A STRICTER BUSINESS REASONS STANDARD TO

REBUT

A

PRIMA FACIE CASE OF DISPARATE TREATMENT IN GATED
COMMUNITIES

A non-resident of a gated community is unable to maintain a
constitutional cause of action due to lack of state action
requirements. 14' For a non-resident to maintain a cause of action
for the discriminatory effects of gated communities, the defendant
must be required to make a more rigorous showing of legitimate
business reasons under the FHA cause of action.
A. Three Business JustificationTests
1. Reasonableness Test
There is disagreement among the federal appellate courts
over which test should be used for rebutting a prima facie case of
disparate impact. The courts have used one of three different
tests. The least restrictive test was set forth in 1996 in Pfaff v.
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development.4
In Pfaff, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly refused to
apply the test used by the administrative agency in charge of fair
housing disputes.' Instead, the court articulated a less restrictive
"reasonableness" standard that the defendant must meet to rebut
a prima facie case of disparate impact. 43 The Pfaff court found the
landlord's occupancy restrictions "certainly reasonable to seek to
preserve the value of one's property" and sufficient to satisfy the
burden.""'

According to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in United
States v. Badgett, a landlord or property owner need only prove
that a policy or restriction was implemented for a legitimate
business reason and that the policy or restriction was
reasonable. 14

140. See supra Part III(A) for an explanation of the lack of state action
requirements for a private entity to successfully maintain a constitutional
cause of action.
141. 88 F.3d at 749.
142. Id. at 748. The court refused to apply the Mountain Side test. Id. at
747. It reasoned that the "Mountain Side standard is broad, general, and
prospective in application." Id. at 748. The court further explained that it is
in its discretion to disregard deference to an agency's (HUD's) opinion where
the standard used is broad, general, and prospective. Id.
143. Id. at 749.
144. Id.
145. See also United States v. Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176, 1180 (8th Cir. 1992)
(requiring a "reasonable" business reason to rebut a prima facie case of
disparate impact).
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2. Business Necessity Test
In Mountain Side Mobile Estates v. HUD146 a second test was
applied. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals set forth a test that
requires a more stringent standard than the Pfaff test.'47 In
Mountain Side, the mobile home park management implemented
policies that restricted occupancy to three people per home. The
plaintiff challenged
the restriction as discriminatory based on
14
familial status.
In administrative proceedings, the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) determined that a defendant must
149
show a compelling business need for a discriminatory practice.
However, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals eliminated the
"compelling" element."0 The court determined that the defendant
must show that the policy or restriction was a legitimate "business
necessity." 5 ' To meet this burden, the defendant is required to
prove that the discriminatory practice or policy had a manifest
relationship to the housing in question, and that it was a nonThe court held that
pretextual genuine business need.1 '
occupancy restrictions maintained for residents' and guests'
quality of life were legitimate, non-pretextual business
justifications sufficient to meet the burden."3
3. Least Restrictive Means Test
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals articulated the third,
and strictest, test for the defendant's burden in Huntington
The court required that the
Branch, NAACP v. Huntington.
defendant present bona fide and legitimate justifications for its
policy or practice."' Additionally, the court required that the
defendant demonstrate there were no less discriminatory
alternatives available.
In Huntington, the town refused to amend an ordinance that
restricted multifamily housing. The effect of the ordinance was

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

56 F.3d 1243, 1254 (10th Cir. 1995).
Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 747.
Mountain Side Mobile, 56 F.3d at 1246, 1247.
Id. at 1254.
Id.
Id.

152. Id.
153. Mountain Side Mobile, 56 F.3d at 1257.
154. Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 936 (2d Cir.

1988).
155. Id. at 939.
156. Id. See Betsey v. Turtle Creek Ass'n, 736 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1984)
(requiring a defendant to show the absence of any acceptable alternative that
will accomplish the same business goal with less discrimination before the
defendant can rely on the business necessity justification to rebut a plaintiffs
prima facie case).
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that it disallowed the construction of low income housing in a
white neighborhood. The town's several business justifications for
the practice concerned traffic issues, health hazards, inconsistency
with housing assistance plans and zoning plans, inadequate play
areas, inadequate sewage systems, and undersized units.'5 The
court held all the justifications to be entirely insubstantial, weak
or inadequate to meet the burden."8 The court also held that there
were less restrictive means available to the defendant than
refusing to allow construction of the housing. 159
Thus, in order to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination in
the Second Circuit, a defendant must establish that there are
legitimate business reasons for its policies and that there are no
less discriminatory means available.
The above cases demonstrate the circuits' disagreement as to
the level of strictness that should be applied to the business
justification test. The tests range from requiring reasonable
business reasons, to legitimate business necessities, to bona fide
legitimate business justifications with no less restrictive means
available.16'
To deter gated community associations and
developers from enacting overly restrictive and discriminatory
income requirements, there needs to be a cohesive test the courts
can apply when a defendant attempts to rebut a prima facie case
of discrimination.
157. Huntington, 844 F.2d at 940.
158. Id.
159. See id. at 940-41.
160. Under both the Pfaff test and the Mountain Side test, after the
defendant proffers his business justifications, the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff. Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 747; Mountain Side Mobile, 56 F.3d at 1254. The
plaintiff has the opportunity to show that even though the defendant claims a
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the practice, it will not be sufficient
to avoid liability. Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 747; Mountain Side Mobile, 56 F.3d at 1254.
The plaintiff does this by showing proof that the business reason was merely
pretextual or that there were alternative methods that were less restrictive to
achieve the defendant's business purpose. Mountain Side Mobile, 56 F.2d at
1254. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (giving
the plaintiff in an employment discrimination case under Title VII the
opportunity to show that the defendant's reasons were merely pretextual by
showing "the presumptively valid reasons for [plaintiffs] rejection were in fact
a cover up for a ... discriminatory decision"). McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at
805. McDonnell Douglas was the first case to require a three-part burdenshifting test for discrimination cases. Id. at 802. The Mountain Side test
requires a more stringent standard than the McDonnell Douglas test.
Mountain Side Mobile, 56 F.2d at 1252. See also McHaney v. Spears, 526 F.
Supp. 566, 572 (W.D. Tenn. 1981) (finding that a defendant-seller's
requirement that his son build the house as part of terms for sale was mere
pretext, wholly lacking in justification). Compare Huntington, 844 F.2d at
935. Under the Huntington test the defendant, not the plaintiff, is the one
who must show that there are no less discriminatory means available. Id.
The burden shifts to the plaintiff only to show that the defendant has not met
his burden. Id.
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B. Merging Business Tests to Create a Stricter Burden on Gated
Communities
For a more stringent showing of business need, the three
business tests articulated by the courts must be merged to create a
higher burden for the defendant. Second, the courts should not
accept business justifications based wholly on protecting property
value.
The reasonableness standard from Pfaff may be a sufficient
standard when applying it to legitimate occupancy restrictions to
However, it is too
maintain the value of a landlord's property.'
lenient a standard when applying it to discrimination that harms
a community because it has the effect of perpetuating
segregation. 6' As a threshold issue, the courts should require a
defendant to establish that a practice is reasonable before it can
satisfy the legitimate business reason test.
The Mountain Side test, which requires a business necessity
instead of merely legitimate business reasons, is a stricter
standard that the courts should apply.1"3 All gated community
policies that have a discriminatory impact on a protected class
should manifest a rational relationship to the housing and have
However, beyond this
legitimate non-pretextual justifications."
requirement, the gated community defendant should be required
to show that the practice or policy that has a significant
discriminatory impact is a necessity for conducting business.
Additionally, the Huntington test'65 should be applied. Gated
community defendants,'66 not the plaintiffs," 7 should be required to
show that there were no other less discriminatory alternatives
For
available to them than the practice they implemented.
that
the
example, the defendant should be required to show
community
income and asset requirements implemented by the
are not inflated to grossly outweigh mortgage affordability
A community's goal of using profiling and
calculations.
prescreening techniques to segregate itself from individuals who
could afford the property is based on impermissible factors, such
as race.16 The defendant should be required to show that the
161. Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 749.
162. Huntington, 844 F.2d. at 937.

163. 56 F.3d at 1254.
164. Id. at 1257.
165. Huntington, 844 F.2d. at 939
166. Id.; Betsey v. Turtle Creek Ass'n, 736 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1984).

167. Mountain Side Mobile, 56 F.2d at 1254.
168. McHaney v. Spears, 526 F. Supp. 566, 572 (W.D. Tenn. 1981) (finding
that none of defendant's three business justifications were sufficient to rebut

plaintiffs' prima facie case of discrimination because the defendant's absence
of a counteroffer to plaintiffs' offer to buy the property showed that defendant

did not want to sell to plaintiffs on any terms because of their race, and no
other reason).
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higher price charged for gated community housing is determined
by costs of gates and security, and other amenities the community
provides its residents, not by a desire to keep out particular
potential buyers.
The courts have accepted different business reasons as
sufficient to meet the defendant's burden.169 Protecting property
value, alone, should not be considered sufficient under any of the
three tests articulated and used by the courts. 7 ' Courts should
"carefully scrutinize" reasons given as justifications for
7
discriminatory gated community practices.1 1
Further, a defendant should not be able to justify a
discriminatory practice by showing that he has sold property to
minority individuals in the past. Prior nondiscriminatory conduct
is not a defense to evidence that speaks of racial exclusion.172
CONCLUSION

Gated communities perpetuate exclusionary effects on nonresidents through the use of laws that support their policies and
practices. Policies such as strict income requirements may not
show intent to discriminate against minorities. However, they do
have a disproportionate effect on minorities by excluding them
169. See Mountain Side Mobile, 56 F.3d at 1256 (finding sewer capacity
issues and quality of life to be sufficient business justifications for an
occupancy restriction that the defendant could use to rebut plaintiffs prima
facie case); Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 749 (holding that the preservation of the economic
value of property was a legitimate business reason for an occupancy restriction
that was sufficient to rebut the plaintiffs prima facie case of discrimination in
the Ninth Circuit); United States v. Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176, 1180 (8th Cir.
1992) (stating that a maximum occupancy policy that was enacted due to
parking limitations was not a sufficient business justification that the
defendant could use to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination); Williams v.
Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 828 (8th Cir. 1974) (finding the defendant's
alleged desire to insure the orderly growth and development of the subdivision
was not a sufficient business justification); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v.
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1286 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that
legitimate desires to protect property values and the integrity of the village's
zoning plan were not sufficient business justifications to rebut plaintiffs case);
Huntington, 844 F.2d at 940 (finding that seven detailed business
justifications, including traffic issues, health hazards, inconsistency with
housing assistance plans and zoning plans, inadequate play areas, and
undersized units, were sufficient to support a town's refusal to rezone for
private multi-family housing).
170. See Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1286 (deciding that a legitimate
desire to protect property values is not sufficient to rebut a plaintiffs prima
facie case of discrimination); Boyd v. Lefrak Org., 509 F.2d 1110, 1116 (2d Cir.
1975) (stating that "[r]acial discrimination cannot, of course, be condoned
because it is accomplished through a sophisticated or indirect method ....
Nor should it be excused on the theory that it is the product of thoughtlessness
rather than willfulness. In either event, the harmful effect is the same."). Id.
171. McHaney, 526 F. Supp. at 572.
172. Id. at 573.
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from the community. They also have a disparate impact on
surrounding communities when a segregating effect is created.
An individual who has been harmed by gated community
practices is not able to maintain a constitutional cause of action
because of state action requirements. However, under a disparate
impact theory, an excluded individual can maintain a statutory
cause of action under the FHA.
Implementation of the proposed standards will hinder a gated
community defendant from continuing business practices that
have tinges of racism.'73 If the defendant is not able to articulate
acceptable business necessities for a challenged practice, and
cannot show that the practice was the least restrictive means to
achieve his purpose, he will not be able to rebut an excluded nonresident's prima facie case of discrimination.
One of the truths we hold to be self-evident is that a
government that tells its citizens what they may say will
soon be dictating what they may think. But in a country that
puts such a high premium on freedom, we cannot allow
ourselves to be the captives of orthodox, culturally imposed
thinking patterns. Indeed, I can conceive no imprisonment so
complete, no subjugation so absolute, no debasement so
abject as the enslavement of the mind. "'

173. Id.
174. Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Syst., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 895 (Cal. 1999)
(Brown, J., dissenting).

